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Program Monitoring in a Mandatory-results Model
Srikar Reddy Reddy
ABSTRACT
In many real enforcement systems, a security-relevant action must return a result be-
fore the application program that invoked that action can continue to execute. However,
current models of runtime mechanisms do not capture this requirement on results being
returned to application programs; current models are limited to reasoning about policies
and enforcement in terms of actions alone, without considering the results of those actions.
This thesis presents a more general model of runtime policy enforcement in which all actions
return (possibly void- or unit-type) results. This mandatory-results model more accurately
reflects the capabilities and limitations of real enforcement mechanisms, particularly those
mechanisms that operate by monitoring function/method invocations. We analyze the new
model to show that result-returning runtime monitors enforce a strict superset of the safety
policies, including some nontrivial liveness policies.
iii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Runtime enforcement mechanisms dynamically monitor untrusted target applications
to ensure that those applications adhere to desired policies. Although computability and
proof theory provide good frameworks for understanding which policies can be enforced on
target applications through static analysis, we currently lack sufficiently general frameworks
for understanding which policies can be enforced through runtime mechanisms. This thesis
presents a new, general framework for reasoning about runtime enforcement and investigates
the limits of enforcing policies dynamically, an important problem given the popularity of
runtime mechanisms (in firewalls, operating systems, auditing tools, spam filters, intrustion-
detection systems, access-control systems, etc).
Much research has been performed to model generic runtime mechanisms and analyze
their enforcement capabilities (cf. Chapter 5.1). However, existing models of generic run-
time mechanisms are based on the system abstractions shown in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1a
depicts a target application issuing instructions—or more abstractly, actions—for an under-
lying system (such as an operating system, virtual machine, or CPU) to execute. We can
secure the application by interposing a monitoring mechanism between the application and
the underlying system, as in Figure 1.1b. The mechanism, a security monitor, dynamically
transforms the application’s actions to ensure that the overall sequence of actions actually
executed is valid (i.e., satisfies a desired policy).
Although existing models of software security fit into the framework of Figure 1.1, that
framework fails to capture the semantics of practical systems, in which actions return results
and an application cannot continue executing after issuing an action a until receiving a
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Figure 1.1. Existing model of an insecure application (a) secured by a program monitor (b).
result for a. Figure 1.2a depicts this more practical scenario, which encompasses application
actions that:
1. Return results, such as actions for dereferencing pointers, for returning user input, for
reading and returning data in a file or network buffer, etc.
2. Raise exceptions, such as actions for dereferencing (possibly null) pointers, writing to
(possibly nonexistent) files or network ports, etc. In this case, we simply treat the
exceptions that can be raised as potential return values.
3. Do not return results, such as actions for outputting text to a monitor or moving data
from one register to another. In this case, the actions have an (implicit or explicit)
void or unit return type, so we can view the underlying system as returning an actual
void or () value upon completion of one of these actions.
Hence, all actions, even those not normally considered to return results, fit into a framework
in which actions return results.
Besides interposing on and dynamically transforming actions, practical monitors can
interpose on and dynamically transform action results, as Figure 1.2b illustrates. This is a
crucial capability for enforcing many security policies, such as privacy, access-control, and
information-flow policies, which may require mechanisms to sanitize the results of actions
before applications access those results. For example, policies may require that system files
get hidden when user-level applications retrieve directory listings, or that email messages
flagged by spam filters do not get returned to email-client applications. Because existing
frameworks for reasoning about generic runtime mechanisms do not model results of actions,
one cannot use existing frameworks to specify or reason about enforcement of such policies.
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Figure 1.2. This thesis’s model of an insecure application with results (a) secured by a
program monitor (b).
Contributions This thesis generalizes existing frameworks of runtime enforcement to
capture the practical ability of monitors to transform both actions and results, as illustrated
in Figure 1.2b. We make the following contributions.
1. Chapter 2 modifies existing definitions of policies, properties, and program executions,
to take into account action results.
2. Chapter 3 defines mandatory-results automata (MRAs), new models of run-time en-
forcement mechanisms that interpose on and ensure the security of two streams of
events: application actions and the results of those actions. MRAs are obligated
to output a result to the application for its most recently invoked action before the
application can invoke another action.
3. Chapter 4 analyzes MRAs to show that they enforce a strict superset of the safety
policies, including some nontrivial liveness policies.
This thesis addresses one of what we consider to be the two principal shortcomings
of existing runtime-enforcement frameworks: the inability to reason about (1) results of
actions and (2) concurrency. We leave the complex issues of concurrency in monitoring
frameworks for future work and here focus on monitoring synchronous actions (i.e., actions
for which the application must receive a return value before continuing to execute) and the
results of those actions.
3
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Before defining mandatory-results automata (MRAs) and what it means for an MRA to
enforce a policy, we first need to define policies and set up some basic notation for specifying
systems and traces. Most of the notation and definitions presented in this chapter are
extended versions of notation and definitions in previous work (extended to include results
of actions) [1, 2, 3].
2.1 Notation
We define a system abstractly, in terms of the actions it can execute to perform com-
putation and the possible results of those actions. The system’s interface determines its
action set; for example, if the executing system is an operating system then actions would
be system calls; if the executing system is a virtual machine then actions would be virtual-
machine-code instructions (e.g., Java bytecode, including calls to API libraries integrated
with the virtual machine); and if the executing system is machine hardware then the ac-
tions would be machine-code instructions. We use the metavariable A to represent the
(nonempty, possibly countably infinite) set of actions on a system and R (disjoint from A)
to represent the (nonempty, possibly countably infinite) set of results. An event is either an
action or a result, and we use E to denote the set of events on a system; E = A∪R. Given
a set of events E, act(E) refers to all the actions in E and res(E) to all the results in E.
An execution (or trace) is a possibly infinite sequence of events. A trace of a target
application is the sequence of events that occur during a run of that application; the ex-
ecution has finite length if the run terminates and infinite length otherwise. Because we
assume synchronous actions, all executions contain alternating actions and results; that is,
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all executions under consideration in this thesis have the form a0; r0; a1; r1; . . . ; an; rn or
a0; r0; a1; r1; . . . ; an or a1; r1; a2; r2; . . . (where r0 is the result of action a0, r1 is the result
of a1, etc.). The symbol · represents a zero-length execution (in which no events occur).
When event e occurs in execution x, we write e ∈ x. We denote the sequence of actions in
an execution x as acts(x) and the sequence of results in x as rslts(x). Moreover, we denote
the ith event (i ∈ N) of execution x as x[i] and the length of finite execution x as |x|. We
also denote the set of all finite-length executions on a system with event set E as E∗, all
infinite-length executions as Eω, and all finite- and infinite-length executions as E∞.
We let the metavariable e range over events, a over actions, r over results, ε and x
over executions, and X over sets of executions (i.e., subsets of E∞). Sometimes it will be
convenient to use α as a metavariable ranging over actions and · , while ρ ranges over results
and · .
The notation x; ε represents concatenation of two executions x and ε (the first of which
must have finite length). When x is a finite prefix of ε we write x  ε or ε  x, and when
x is a proper prefix of ε we write x ≺ ε or ε  x. Finally, when E is clear from context,
we make extensive use of abbreviations of the form ∃x  ε : F in place of the more verbose
∃x ∈ E∗ : (x  ε ∧ F ).
2.2 Policies and Properties
A policy is a predicate on sets of executions [2]; a set of executions X ⊆ E∞ satisfies a
policy P if and only if P (X ). Some policies are also properties. Policy P is a property if
and only if there exists a characteristic predicate Pˆ over E∞ such that for all X ⊆ E∞, the
following is true [2]:
P(X )⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ X : Pˆ (x) (Property)
This distinction between properties and more general policies is important when rea-
soning about dynamic enforcement mechanisms because such mechanisms monitor a single
execution at a time and make decisions about whether that single execution is secure,
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thereby enforcing properties rather than policies. In contrast, static-analysis mechanisms
can enforce nonproperty policies by considering all executions of an application.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between a property P and its characteristic pred-
icate Pˆ , so we use the notation Pˆ unambiguously to refer to both a characteristic predicate
and the property it induces. When Pˆ (ε), we say that ε satisfies or obeys the property, or ε
is valid or legal ; similarly, if ¬Pˆ (ε) then we say that ε violates or disobeys the property, or
ε is invalid or illegal. Properties satisfied by the empty execution that are decidable over
finite-length executions are called reasonable properties.
Because the definitions of policy and property above operate on executions containing
results, it is possible to define policies that take results into consideration. For example, a
policy might be satisfied by exactly those sets of executions X in which all natural numbers
n get returned as the result of action a in some execution in X . This policy is not a
property because there is no predicate Pˆ that can look at individual executions in isolation
to determine whether the results of all a actions in all executions of X form a complete set
of natural numbers. On the other hand, consider a policy satisfied by exactly those sets of
executions X in which no result of any ls action (in any execution in X ) contains the string
.hidden. This policy is a property because it is satisfied if and only if every execution in
X lacks .hidden-containing results to all ls actions.
Properties, such as the hidden-files policy just described, specifying that “nothing bad
ever occurs” are called safety properties [4]. This well-studied class of properties includes
commonly enforced properties such as access-control properties (specifying that no illegal
accessing of resources ever occurs). Technically, safety means that every invalid execution
must have some invalid prefix after which all extensions are invalid [5], so a property Pˆ on
a system with event set E is a safety property if and only if:
∀ε ∈ E∞ : (¬Pˆ (ε) =⇒ ∃ε′  ε : ∀x  ε′ : ¬Pˆ (x)) (Safety)
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On the other hand, liveness properties state that nothing irremediably bad ever happens
in a finite amount of time [1]. Like safety properties, liveness properties are well studied.
But unlike safety properties, liveness includes particularly difficult- or impossible-to-enforce
properties such as that an application will eventually input a particular value or terminate.
Formally, a property Pˆ on a system with event set E is a liveness property if and only if:
∀ε ∈ E∗ : ∃x  ε : Pˆ (x) (Liveness)
Exactly one policy is both a safety and a liveness property: the property >, which
considers all executions valid [1].
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CHAPTER 3
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT WITH MANDATORY-RESULTS
AUTOMATA (MRAS)
Having defined executions, policies, and properties in the previous chapter, we are ready
to formally model monitors that behave as in Figure 1.2b.
3.1 Operational Semantics of MRAs
Synchronous application actions impose a major constraint on how monitors may be-
have; the monitors must return a result to the target before seeing the next action the
target wishes to execute. Real program monitors (e.g., as created in the Naccio [6],
PoET/PSLang [7], Polymer [8], LoPSiL [9], and ConSpec [10] systems) have this mandatory-
results constraint, and it is for this constraint that mandatory-results automata are named.
We model as MRAs monitors that can interpose on and transform synchronous actions
and their results. An MRA M is tuple (E,Q, qo, δ), where E is the event set over which M
operates, Q is the finite or countably infinite set of possible states of M , qo is M ’s initial
state, and δ is a transition function of the form δ : Q × E → Q × E, which takes M ’s
current state and an event being input to M (either an action the target is attempting to
execute or a result the underlying system has produced) and returns a new state for M and
an event to be output from M (either an action to be executed on the underlying system
or a result to be returned to the target). In contrast to previous work [11, 12, 3], we do not
require δ to be decidable (it may not halt on some inputs); this ability of MRAs to diverge
accurately models the abilities of real runtime mechanisms.
We call
αi
ρo
[
q
]αo
ρi
a configuration of monitor M , where q is M ’s current state, αi is either
· or the action currently input to M (by the target program), αo is either · or the action
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being output by M (to the executing system), ρi is either · or the result being input to M
(by the executing system), and ρo is either · or the result being output by M (to the target
program). When we do not care about the values of αi, αo, ρi, and ρo in configuration
αi
ρo
[
q
]αo
ρi
, we simply write the configuration as q. Also, we normally do not bother to write
the dots in configurations, so
a[
q
]
r
is the same as
a
·
[
q
]·
r
. The starting configuration of
an MRA is
a[
q0
]
; that is, the monitor begins executing in its initial state with the first
application action being input. Notice that our bracket-based notation for configurations
matches the graphic representation of monitors’ inputs and outputs as shown in Figure 1.2b.
We are now ready to describe the operational semantics of MRAs, as defined by a la-
beled single-step judgment whose form is
αi
ρo
[
q
]αo
ρi
εT
εS
//M
α′i
ρ′o
[
q′
]α′o
ρ′i
. This judgment means
that MRA M is taking a single step from configuration
αi
ρo
[
q
]αo
ρi
to configuration
α′i
ρ′o
[
q′
]α′o
ρ′i
while building target execution εT and system execution εS . The target execution εT is the
execution viewed by the target; in other words, εT is the sequence of actions that the target
has sent to, and the results the target has received from, the monitor. Similarly, the system
execution εS is the execution viewable by the system, that is, all the actions executed on,
and the results of actions executed on, the underlying system. A final note about notation
used in our single-step judgment: because M will always be clear from the context, we
normally omit it from the judgment.
The definition of MRAs’ single-step semantics appears in Figure 3.1. There are three
inference rules defining MRA transitions in Figure 3.1; each rule allows an MRA to transition
from a current state q to a new state q′. The first rule (Ins-on-Act) enables an MRA to
insert an action a′ that will be executed before the monitor returns a result to the target
for the action a currently being input to the MRA; because a′ will be executed, it is placed
into the system execution. The second rule (Res-on-Ins) enables an MRA to update its
state in response to receiving the result of an action it just inserted; because the result
is coming from the underlying system, it too gets placed into the system execution. The
third rule (Res-on-Act) enables an MRA to return a result r to the target application for an
action a that the target has sent as input to the MRA; because a and r are events viewable
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αi
ρo
[
q
]αo
ρi
εT
εS
//
α′i
ρ′o
[
q′
]α′o
ρ′i
δ(q, a) = (q′, a′)
a[
q
]
a′
//
a[
q′
]a′ (Ins-on-Act)
δ(q, r) = (q′, )
a[
q
]
r r
//
a[
q′
] (Res-on-Ins)
δ(q, a) = (q′, r)
a[
q
]
a;r //
r
[
q′
] (Res-on-Act)
Figure 3.1. Single-step semantics of mandatory-results automata (monitor-controlled tran-
sitions).
by the target, they get placed into the target execution. The simplicity of these inference
rules, as much as is present, is the product of much effort and iterating through numerous
less-satisfactory attempts.
In addition to the monitor-controlled transitions shown in Figure 3.1, there are two
single-step transitions between configurations that can occur outside of the monitor’s con-
trol. First, the transition
r
[
q
]
−→ a
[
q
]
occurs when the monitor has finished processing an
input action by returning a result r to the target, and then the target sends its next action
a to the monitor; however, if the target generates no additional actions then the MRA
never makes a transition from (and therefore terminates in) configuration
r
[
q
]
. The second
single-step transition outside of the monitor’s control is
a[
q
]a′ → a[q]
r
, which occurs when
the executing system returns a result r for an inserted action a′. This transition always oc-
curs in our model from configuration
a[
q
]a′
because we assume that the underlying system
returns a result for every action it is asked to execute.
We next make several observations about the operational semantics of MRAs:
1. A wildcard ( ) exists in the premise of rule Res-on-Ins in place of an event e because
the rule, which causes no event to be output from the MRA, ignores e’s value.
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2. An MRA can “accept” an application action a by inserting it (with rule Ins-on-Act),
receiving and remembering the result r of executing a (with rule Res-on-Ins), and
then returning r to the application (with rule Res-on-Act).
3. An MRA can “halt” an application by inserting an action like exit, if the underlying
system can execute such an action. Alternatively, an MRA can enter an infinite loop
to block additional actions and results from being input and output. An MRA can
achieve a similar effect by repeatedly transitioning with the Res-on-Act rule, which
will cause the system (but not target) execution to terminate.
4. MRAs are obligated to return results to applications before receiving new input ac-
tions. No transitions described above allow an MRA to input a new action until it
has discharged the last action by returning a result for it.
5. We make no assumptions about the underlying system that executes application ac-
tions beyond that it produces some result (possibly an exception) for every action it
is asked to execute. The underlying system may produce results nondeterministically
or through uncomputable means (e.g., by reading a weather sensor or spontaneous
keyboard input). This design captures the reality that monitors can only determine
the results of many actions (e.g., getCurrentCloudCover, inputNextCharFromUser,
or more common actions like readFileData or dereferenceLocation) by having the
underlying system execute those actions. This design also makes the single-step re-
lation nondeterministic, as the system may return any of a number of results for the
same action in an execution.
6. Just as MRAs are agnostic of how the underlying system generates results, MRAs are
agnostic of how the target generates actions. Agnosticism of target applications makes
MRAs purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms; MRAs cannot use any knowledge
of application source code (i.e., how applications generate actions) when enforcing
properties.
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These observations describe ideas that match our understanding of how real program moni-
tors (such as are implemented in the Naccio [6], PoET/PSLang [7], Polymer [8], LoPSiL [9],
and ConSpec [10] systems) behave.
Having defined the single-step semantics of MRAs, we define the multi-step judgment
in the standard way as the reflexive, transitive closure of the single-step judgment. The
multi-step judgment form is q
εT ∗
εS
// q′ where εT and εS are the target and system execu-
tions formed (via concatenations) during the multi-step transition from configuration q to
configuration q′.
3.2 MRA-based Enforcement
We adopt the notion that mechanisms enforce policies when they are sound and transpar-
ent [13, 14, 15, 3]. Soundness requires that the observable execution, which is the execution
output from the mechanism, must satisfy the desired policy. Soundness alone is unsatis-
factory, though, because any mechanism can enforce any reasonable property by simply
rejecting all inputs and always outputting an empty execution (thus, all of its observable
outputs are valid). Transparency prevents this situation by requiring mechanisms to pre-
serve the semantics of valid input executions; if the application and system only provide
valid inputs to the mechanism, then the mechanism must not alter the semantics of those
valid inputs.
To reason about transparency and whether a mechanism preserves the semantics of
valid input, we assume the presence of a system-specific equivalence relation ≈ on (possibly
infinite-length) executions. When x ≈ x′ we say that x and x′ are semantically equiva-
lent. We place no constraints on this equivalence relation beyond that properties may not
distinguish between equivalent executions.
One more judgment will make it easier to define enforcement. For reasoning about both
soundness and transparency, we need a way to say that an enforcement mechanism M takes
εi as its input, and transforms εi into the output execution εo. This idea of viewing the
role of enforcement mechanisms as transforming possibly invalid input executions into valid
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executions (soundness), while preserving the semantics of valid input executions (trans-
parency), comes from earlier work [11, 3]. When mechanism M transforms input execution
εi into the output execution εo, we write εi ⇓M εo. Defining the ⇓M judgment for MRAs is
a bit tricky, so we postpone that definition until we finish defining enforcement. For now,
and throughout Chapter 3.2.1, let us assume that we already have a definition of ⇓M for
all M that are MRAs.
3.2.1 Effective Enforcement
We define enforcement in terms of soundness and transparency. As in earlier work [11,
3], we call this style of enforcement “effective≈ enforcement” because it defines when a
mechanism is behaving fully effectively and relies on the equivalence relation ≈.
Definition 1 (Effective≈ Enforcement). An MRA M=(E,Q, qo, δ) effectively≈ enforces a
property Pˆ on a system with event set E and semantic equivalence relation ≈ if and only
if:
∀εi, εo ∈ E∞ : (εi ⇓M εo) =⇒ (Pˆ (εo) ∧ (Pˆ (εi) =⇒ εi ≈ εo))
Because equivalence relations are system specific, and because earlier work has proved
that equivalence relations enable security automata to enforce any reasonable property
(including, for example, termination) [3], we follow previous work and focus here on systems
in which the equivalence relation ≈ is just the (system-independent) equality relation =.
By focusing on execution equality, we are considering lower bounds on true enforcement
capabilities; any property effectively= enforceable on a system with equivalence relation ≈
must also be effectively≈ enforceable (because equality implies equivalence).
To reason about possibly infinite-length executions being equal, we formally define two
executions to be equal when they share all the same prefixes.
Definition 2 (Equality of Executions). For all event sets E and executions x1, x2 ∈ E∞,
x1 = x2 if and only if (∀ε  x1 : ε  x2) and (∀ε  x2 : ε  x1).
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For the remainder of this thesis, we will write “effective enforcement” or just “enforce-
ment” in place of “effective= enforcement”.
3.2.2 Input and Output Executions with MRAs
We now return to the postponed issue of which executions MRAs input and output; our
goal is to define when the εi ⇓M εo judgment holds for an MRA M and possibly infinite-
length executions εT and εS . There are several hurdles to overcome in order to define this
transforms relation, but its definition will enable us to judge whether given MRAs enforce
desired properties.
We have already defined (in Chapter 3.1) how MRAs build up target and system execu-
tions with the multi-step judgment q
εT ∗
εS
// q′ . However, this judgment only lets us reason
about the target and system executions after a finite number of steps. MRAs may make an
infinite number of transitions while monitoring a program run, so we must generalize the
multi-step judgment to handle possibly infinite-length target and system executions built
up through possibly infinitely many MRA transitions. Hence, we introduce the judgment
εT oo
M
// εS to indicate that the MRA M , beginning in its initial state, builds target and
system executions εT and εS during its entire run. Intuitively, εT oo
M
// εS holds if and
only if, an any finite number of steps, M only builds target and system executions that are
prefixes of εT and εS , and conversely, M builds target and system executions containing
every prefix of εT and εS . Formally, we define εT oo
M
// εS as follows.
Definition 3 (Possibly Infinite-length Target and System Executions). For all MRA M =
(E,Q, qo, δ) and εT , εS ∈ E∞, εT oo
M
// εS if and only if:
1. ∀q′ ∈ Q : ∀ε′T ∈ E∗ : ∀ε′S ∈ E∗ : (( qo
ε′T ∗
ε′S
// q′ ∧ acts(ε′T )  acts(εT ) ∧ rslts(ε′S) 
rslts(εS)) =⇒ (ε′T  εT ∧ ε′S  εS))
2. ∀ε′T  εT : ∀ε′S  εS : ∃q′ ∈ Q : ∃ε′′T  ε′T : ∃ε′′S  ε′S : qo
ε′′T ∗
ε′′S
// q′
To define the transforms judgment, we also must define which execution a monitor in-
puts and which it outputs. Until now, our rules for MRAs have built target and system
14
executions, rather than input and output executions, so we have to define how to convert
target and system executions into input and output executions. Target and system execu-
tions are the executions visible to targets and systems, but input and output executions
are the executions input to, and output from, the MRA itself. That is, an input execution
includes the actions input from the target and the results of those actions as input from
the underlying system. An output execution includes actions output to the system and the
results of those actions as output to the target program. Hence, soundness will require that
the actions actually executed by the system and the results actually returned to the target
are valid, allowing us to reason about MRAs enforcing result-sanitization properties, such
as the hidden-files policy described in Chapter 2.2. Also, transparency will require that if
the MRA receives a valid stream of actions from the target and results from the system,
then it must end up outputting those same actions to the system and those same results to
the target.
Given possibly infinite-length target and system executions εT and εS , we build the input
execution by taking all the actions in εT and interspersing the results to those actions as
first found in εS . Similarly, we build the output execution by taking all the actions in εS and
interspersing the results to those actions as first found in εT . Thus, we would convert target
execution a1; r1; a2; r2 and system execution a1; r2; a2; r1 into input execution a1; r2; a2; r1
and output execution a1; r1; a2; r2. Similarly, we would convert target execution a1; r1; a2; r2
and system execution a2; r1; a1; r2 into input execution a1; r2; a2; r1 and output execution
a2; r2; a1; r1. However, an issue arises when an action a in εT is not present in εS , so we have
no result to include for a in εi. In this case we keep a in εi but use a’s result r from εT , rather
than from εS , as a’s result in εi. Thus, action a, which the target sent to the MRA, correctly
counts as an input action, and because the MRA never actually input a result for a from
the system, we treat the result r that the MRA returned to the target for a (which is the
only result we have for a) as the input execution’s result for a. Note that including r in the
input execution does not damage the output execution because the MRA never output a, so
r could not be included in the output execution anyway. An analogous issue arises when an
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input(εT , εS) = εi
input(·, εS) = · (Input-Dot)
a 6∈ εS
input(a; r; εT , εS) = a; r; input(εT , εS)
(Input-No-Swap)
a 6∈ εS
input(a; r; εT , εS ; a; r′; ε′S) = a; r
′; input(εT , εS ; ε′S)
(Input-Swap)
output(εT , εS) = εo
output(εT , ·) = · (Output-Dot)
a 6∈ εT
output(εT , a; r; εS) = a; r; output(εT , εS)
(Output-No-Swap)
a 6∈ εT
output(εT ; a; r′; ε′T , a; r; εS) = a; r
′; output(εT ; ε′T , εS)
(Output-Swap)
Figure 3.2. Definitions of input and output judgments.
action a in εS is not present in εT ; the issue gets resolved in the same way by keeping a in
εo and using a’s result from εS as a’s result in εo. Putting all these rules together, we would
convert target execution a1; r1; a1; r1; a2; r2; a3; r3 and system execution a4; r4; a3; r1; a1; r2
into input execution a1; r2; a1; r1; a2; r2; a3; r1 and output execution a4; r4; a3; r3; a1; r1.
Figure 3.2 defines two judgments (input(εT , εS)=εi and output(εT , εS)=εo) that hold
when finite-length target and system executions εT and εS have been properly converted
into finite-length input and output executions εi and εo in the manner just described. We
generalize these definitions to infinite-length executions using a technique similar to our
generalization of the multi-step judgment (with finite-length εT and εS) to the εT oo
M
// εS
judgment (which allows infinite-length εT and εS). The first generalized judgment, allowing
all executions to have infinite length and indicating that target and system executions εT
and εS form input execution εi, is written as εT ⊗in εS = εi. That is, ⊗in is an operator that
builds εi simply by starting with εT and swapping in results from εS for the actions in εT .
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Similarly, εT ⊗outεS = εo indicates that possibly infinite-length εo contains all the actions of
εS , with the results of those actions in εT swapped in. To define the εT⊗inεS = εi judgment,
we intuitively require the input function to return only prefixes of εi when given prefixes of
εT , and conversely, the input function must return all prefixes of εi. The εT ⊗out εS = εo
judgment is defined similarly. Formal definitions of the ⊗in and ⊗out operators appear
below.
Definition 4 (⊗in). For all event sets E and εT , εS , εi ∈ E∞, εT ⊗in εS = εi if and only if:
1. ∀ε′T  εT : ∃ε′S  εS : input(ε′T , ε′S)  εi
2. ∀ε′i  εi : ∃ε′T  εT : ∃ε′S  εS : input(ε′T , ε′S) = ε′i
Definition 5 (⊗out). For all event sets E and εT , εS , εo ∈ E∞, εT ⊗out εS = εo if and only
if:
1. ∀ε′S  εS : ∃ε′T  εT : output(ε′T , ε′S)  εo
2. ∀ε′o  εo : ∃ε′S  εS : ∃ε′T  εT : output(ε′T , ε′S) = ε′o
At last, we are ready to define transformation of a possibly infinite-length input ex-
ecution εi to a possibly infinite-length output execution εo by an MRA M , written as
εi ⇓M εo. This judgment holds when M builds target and system executions εT and εS ,
and εT ⊗in εS = εi and εT ⊗out εS = εo.
Definition 6 (MRA Transformation). For all MRAs M = (E,Q, q0, δ) and executions
εi, εo ∈ E∞ : εi ⇓M εo if and only if ∃εT , εS ∈ E∞ : ( εT oo
M
// εS ∧ εT ⊗in εS =
εi ∧ εT ⊗out εS = εo).
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF MRA-ENFORCEABLE POLICIES
This chapter compares the set of properties MRAs can enforce with the more established
sets of safety and liveness properties.
First we show that MRAs can enforce any reasonable safety property. The technique
for enforcing any safety property with an MRA, as with other security automata [3], is to
accept all events as long as they satisfy the safety property and cease execution1 as soon as
an invalid input event is detected. In this way, the MRA will only output valid executions
(soundness), and if the input execution is valid then the MRA’s output will match its
input (because the property is a safety property, which implies that all prefixes of all valid
executions must also be valid).
Theorem 7. Any reasonably safety property Pˆ on a system with event set E can be enforced
by some MRA.
Proof. We construct an MRA M that enforces any such Pˆ as follows:
1. States: Q = E∗ × E∗ (the current target execution paired with the current system
execution)
2. Start state: q0 = (·, ·)
3. Transition function (for simplicity we write δ in terms of high-level transitions):
Consider processing an input action a in state q = (εT , εS) :
1Our proofs in this chapter “cease execution” by having the MRAs enter infinite loops (to block the
MRAs from receiving additional inputs and outputs). In practice, runtime mechanisms could enter infinite
loops but would typically cease execution more straightforwardly by invoking an exit action. We use the
infinite-loop approach to cease execution in our proofs because it does not constrain us to consider systems
with exit-style actions.
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(a) If Pˆ (εT ; a), then insert a and let r be the result obtained for a from the system.
Then, if Pˆ (εT ; a; r), return r to the target and continue in state (εT ; a; r, εS ; a; r).
Otherwise, if ¬Pˆ (εT ; a; r) then enter an infinite loop.
(b) Otherwise, if ¬Pˆ (εT ; a) then enter an infinite loop.
Now we let ε ∈ E∞ be the automaton input. If Pˆ (ε) then by the definition of safety,
all prefixes of ε must be valid, so by the definition of M , M will output all the prefixes of
ε. Hence, M outputs ε in this case and correctly enforces Pˆ on valid executions. In the
case where ¬Pˆ (ε), we must only show that M is sound. By the definition of M , only valid
actions and results get output, soM is sound and correctly enforces Pˆ on all executions.
Moreover, there exist nonsafety, nonliveness properties enforceable by MRAs.
Theorem 8. There exists a reasonable property Pˆ on a system with event set E that is
neither a safety nor a liveness property but can be enforced by an MRA M .
Proof. Let E = {a1, a2, r}, where a1 and a2 are actions and r is a result. Also let Pˆ be
satisfied by exactly those executions matching the pattern (a1; r)∞. Pˆ is reasonable because
it is decidable over all finite inputs and Pˆ (·). Pˆ is not a safety property because there exists
an invalid execution (a1) that can be extended to a valid execution (a1; r). Pˆ is also not a
liveness property because there exists an invalid finite-length execution (a2) that cannot be
extended to a valid execution.
We next define an MRA M to enforce this reasonable nonsafety-nonliveness property.
M operates simply by repeating the following: if the input action is a1 then insert a1 to be
executed, obtain its result r, and output r to the target as the result of a1; otherwise, if the
input action is a2 then enter an infinite loop (i.e., output no additional actions or results).
M is a sound enforcer with respect to Pˆ because its output executions will only ever be
of the form (a1; r)∞ (because it only outputs a1 actions and r results, and it always outputs
an r for every a1 it outputs). M is also transparent because it never modifies valid input
executions (because M outputs every a1 and r it inputs). Hence, M correctly enforces this
reasonable nonsafety-nonliveness property Pˆ .
19
There also exist some nonsafety, liveness properties enforceable by MRAs, as the follow-
ing theorem shows.
Theorem 9. There exists a reasonable property Pˆ on a system with event set E that is not
a safety property but is a liveness property and can be enforced by an MRA M .
Proof. Let E = {a, r}, where a is an action and r is a result. Also let Pˆ be satisfied
by exactly those executions that match the pattern (a; r)∞. Pˆ is reasonable because it is
decidable over all finite inputs and Pˆ (·). Pˆ is not a safety property because there exists
an invalid execution (a) that can be extended to a valid execution (a; r). Pˆ is a liveness
property because the only invalid finite-length executions have the form (a; r)∗; a, but any
such execution can be extended into a valid execution by appending an r.
We next define an MRA M to enforce this reasonable nonsafety-liveness property. M
operates simply by repeating the following: read the input action a, insert a, obtain its
result r, and return r to the target. Thus, M executes every action the target attempts to
execute, and M returns every result generated by the system to the target.
M is a sound enforcer with respect to Pˆ because for every a that it inputs, it outputs
a, inputs r, and outputs r. Therefore, its output executions will only ever be of the form
(a; r)∞. M is also transparent because it never modifies valid input executions (because M
outputs every a and r it inputs). Hence, M correctly enforces this reasonable nonsafety-
liveness property Pˆ .
There are some liveness properties unenforceable by MRAs, such as termination. An
MRA cannot enforce termination because in order to be transparent, it must output all
valid input executions, so for any infinite-length input execution (which must be invalid),
the MRA would have to output all of its prefixes, implying that the MRA outputs the entire
infinite-length input execution over its infinite-length run. Because no MRA can enforce this
liveness property termination, there are also some nonsafety-nonliveness properties proper-
ties unenforceable by MRAs, which we can obtain by taking the conjunction of termination
and any safety property; an MRA cannot not enforce such a nonsafety-nonliveness property
20
MRA-enforceable Properties
Safety Properties Liveness Properties
All Properties
Figure 4.1. Relationships between safety, liveness, and MRA-enforceable properties.
for the same reason it cannot enforce the termination property alone. Figure 4.1 summarizes
all of these findings.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Related Work
In the past decade several researchers have modeled runtime program monitors as se-
curity automata and analyzed their enforcement powers; a recent article surveys these
results [3]. To briefly summarize previous work: Schneider showed that truncation au-
tomata (which accept valid application actions and halt target applications upon inputting
invalid actions) enforce only safety properties [2]; Viswanathan, Kim, and others refined
these safety bounds by adding computability constraints to the safety properties being en-
forced [16, 17]; Fong showed that truncation automata with limited memory (e.g., with
space to store only a bounded number of actions seen) can still enforce practically useful
safety policies [18]; Walker and Aktug et al. presented techniques for statically guaranteeing
that policies represented by truncation automata get enforced at runtime [19, 20, 10]; Dam,
Jacobs, Lundblad, and Piessens found that separating monitorable multithreaded applica-
tion code from unmonitorable Java API code prevents inlined truncation automata from
enforcing some safety properties they could otherwise enforce [21]; Le Guernic et al. and
Hamlen et al. considered some enforcement capabilities of runtime security automata with
access to source code [22, 23, 15]; Ligatti, Bauer, and Walker defined execution-transforming
monitors called edit automata, defined policy enforcement in the presence of edit automata,
and found that edit automata enforce reasonable renewal properties [3, 24]; and Falcone,
Fernandez, and Mounier compared the set of properties enforceable with edit-automata-like
monitors with the safety-progress hierarchy of properties (as defined by Chang, Manna, and
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Pnueli [25]) [26]. In addition, security automata have formed the basis of several policy-
specification languages [7, 14, 8, 10].
Some of the security-automata-related research mentioned above has considered results
of actions [20, 10, 21], but in all these cases the models have been constructed to handle
the specific case of monitoring Java API methods invoked by Java applications. Also, these
previous models treat results as kinds of actions. Treating result-returns as actions poses no
problems in these models because they consider monitors to be truncation automata, which
always accept valid actions (and results) and halt the target when encountering an invalid
action (or result). In contrast, this thesis gives monitors the practical ability to edit (i.e.,
transform) actions and results, which forces us to define a new operational semantics for
security automata that carefully distinguishes between how the automata can edit actions
and results (because the monitors can freely output any number of actions for every action
input but may only output at most one result for every action input and cannot input a
new action until a result for the current input action has been output).
5.2 Conclusion
This thesis has presented a model of runtime monitors that improves on existing models
by capturing the realistic constraint that monitors must return a result for one action
before being able to see the next action (which the application may generate based on the
result of the first action). Incorporating results into the model and obligating monitors to
return (possibly void or unit) results for all monitored actions prevents the monitors from
enforcing some properties, but monitors modeled by MRAs can nonetheless enforce a strict
superset of the safety policies.
These findings are important because they improve our understanding of the sorts of
policies we can ever hope to enforce dynamically in systems with synchronous actions. We
hope that with continued research, we will be able to develop algorithms for decompos-
ing general policies into statically and dynamically enforceable subpolicies, such that we
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could enforce a maximum set of policy constraints statically and the remaining constraints
dynamically.
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